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INTRODUCTION
Corruption has long been understood as a pervasive problem plaguing
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China’s business environment.1 The country ranked 80th on the latest
annual Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency
International in 2013, lower than Brazil and South Africa.2 A high degree
of government involvement in economic affairs and a business culture
emphasizing personal ties and informal relationships are believed to have
contributed to widespread corrupt practices, which continue to pose
significant challenges to foreign corporations with investment and
operations on the ground.3 A long list of high profile multinationals
implicated in corruption scandals in China4 has in recent months included
big names such as Avon Products, Inc., GlaxoSmithKline plc, and J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co.5
Even without conducting business in China or with Chinese
counterparties, investors may become exposed to China’s corruption risks
by investing in securities issued by Chinese or “China-based” companies.6

1. See, e.g., Delia Poon, Exposure to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Guide for U.S.
Companies with Activities in the People’s Republic of China to Minimize Liability, 19 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 327, 339–45 (1996) (identifying local conditions that create significant exposure to
the FCPA for U.S. companies doing business in China); F. Joseph Warin et al., FCPA Compliance in
China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 33, 59–60 (2010) (discussing the
corruption risks presented by Chinese traditions of gift giving in professional contexts).
2. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2013, available at
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results (follow “Download Brochure” hyperlink).
3. See, e.g., Daniel Chow, The Interplay Between China’s Anti-bribery Laws and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1021–24 (2012) (discussing the FCPA compliance
challenges posed by the continued dominance of state-owned enterprises in China’s important
economic sectors); Nicole Y. Hines, Cultural Due Diligence: The Lost Diligence That Must Be Found
by U.S. Corporations Conducting M&A Deals in China to Prevent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Violations, 9 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 19, 55–61 (2007) (discussing how Chinese cultural norms of guanxi and
mianzi affect Chinese corporate culture in connection with FCPA compliance); Warin et al., supra note
1.
4. See Warin et al., supra note 1, at 48–55 (listing significant China-related FCPA investigations
against multinational companies).
5. See Ben Hirschler, Bribery Scandal Slashes GlaxoSmithKline’s Chinese Drug Sales,
REUTERS, Oct. 23, 2013, 10:19 AM EDT, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/usgsk-earnings-idUSBRE99M0DB20131023; Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan
Tracked Business Linked to China Hiring, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 7, 2013, 1:24 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/07/bank-tabulated-business-linked-to-china-hiring/?_r=0;
David
Voreacos, China’s Bribery Culture Poses Risks for Multinationals, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 21, 2013,
12:01 AM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-21/china-s-bribery-culture-poses-risks-formultinationals.html.
6. For various regulatory and taxation reasons, many Chinese companies have restructured
themselves and have adopted an overseas holding structure when engaging in fundraising transactions,
including venture capital/private equity investments and securities offerings in the international capital
markets. Typically, these companies will make the issuer of securities a special purpose vehicle,
incorporated in the United States or in one of the offshore financial centers (e.g., the Grand Cayman
Islands, Bermuda, or the British Virgin Islands), which controls through an equity interest or contractual
arrangements the company’s operating business assets within China. See, e.g., Jing Li, Venture Capital
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Corruption risks may affect securities investors in multiple ways. The
eruption of corruption and fraud scandals involving China-based
companies could lead to market volatility and trading disruption in the
companies’ securities.7 Enforcement actions under Chinese laws and
extraterritorially applied anti-corruption laws, such as the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (the FCPA), generally have a significantly negative impact on
a company’s normal operations and business prospects and consequently
on its investment value.8 Those companies that strive to comply with
applicable anti-corruption laws may also see their competitiveness and
profitability reduced if their competitors engage in corrupt business
practices.9
Although the latest wave of accounting scandals, shareholder
litigation, and regulatory actions led to the delisting and deregistration of
dozens of China-based companies,10 the total count of China-based
companies registered with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC) likely remains over 200.11 Beyond the public
Investments in China: The Use of Offshore Financing Structures and Corporate Relocations, 1 MICH. J.
PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 1, 26–37 (2012) (describing laws and regulations that contributed
to the prevalent use of this offshore investment structure in venture capital investment in Chinese
companies). In this way, many issuers discussed in this article are technically not “Chinese” companies
in light of their place of incorporation and should more appropriately be referred to as “China-based”
companies.
7. See, e.g., Mia Lamar, CCTV Investigation Targets Chinese Drug Maker, WALL ST. J.
MONEYBEAT (Sept. 12, 2013, 2:15 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/09/12/cctvinvestigation-targets-chinese-drug-maker/ (reporting price declines for all China-based pharmaceutical
companies listed in Hong Kong following publicized bribery accusation about one drug company).
8. See Hirschler, supra note 5 (discussing the negative impact of a bribery scandal on
GlaxoSmithKline’s sales and reputation).
9. See MINXIN PEI, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, POLICY BRIEF 55, CORRUPTION
THREATENS CHINA’S FUTURE 6 (2007), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55_
pei_china_corruption_final.pdf (“Corruption creates serious obstacles for Western companies facing
rivals who engage in illegal practices in order to win business in China.”); but see Shaun Rein, How To
Deal with Corruption in China, FORBES, Oct. 7, 2009, 5:17 PM, http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/07/
china-corruption-bribes-leadership-managing-rein.html (advising companies to avoid engaging in
corrupt activities in China and noting that commercial corruption in China is declining).
10. 23 Chinese Companies Delisted in US Since Last Year, WANT CHINA TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012,
11:46), http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120814000039&cid=1102.
11. According to one count, as of June 2012, nearly 300 China-based firms were listing their
securities on U.S. exchanges, and many more firms were quoted on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin
Board (OTCBB) and on other OTC markets. See Zigan Wang, US-Listed Chinese Firms in Credibility
Crisis: Who Are They? Where Are They? 2 (Columbia Univ., Working Paper, 2012), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2177450. Another count mentioned that that there were over 1000 companies in
total trading in U.S. markets by the end of 2011. Zhou Xuan & Shen Xing (周煊, 申星), Zhong Guo
Qi Ye Hai Wai Tui Shi Si Kao: Jin Tui Zhi Jian De Pai Huai (中国企业海外退市思考：进退之间的徘
徊) [Thoughts on Overseas Delistings of Chinese Companies: Going Forward or Backward], 100
GUOJI JINGJI PINGLUN (国际经济评论) [INT’L ECON. REV.] 135, 135 (2012) (China). One source
mentioned that a net delisting of 53 China-based companies took place between 2010 and 2012.

DAI MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

406

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/22/2014 9:33 PM

[Vol 24:403

offering market, many China-based companies have also gained access to
massive amounts of U.S. capital over the past decade through exempted
global offerings of securities under Rule 144A and Regulation S.12 Absent
dramatic changes in China’s domestic capital markets, U.S. investors and
regulators should continue to expect a sizable flow of transactions in
securities of China-based companies reaching the U.S. market.13
China-based securities scandals have so far mainly concerned
accounting irregularities as opposed to pure corruption violations. As
illustrated in the latest shareholder suits arising from the corruption
investigation of PetroChina,14 however, the continuously intensifying anticorruption campaign that China’s current leadership is implementing15 may
cause more corruption-related scandals to be exposed, to the detriment of
issuers and investors.16 To protect investors, United States regulators
should examine whether existing regulations suffice to protect against the
corruption risks associated with China-based securities.
LESSONS TO BE LEARNT – US SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS AGAINST CHINESE DOMICILED COMPANIES
(2013), available at http://stage.plusweb.org/Portals/0/Event%20Material/Lessons%20to%20be%20
Learnt%20-%20US%20Securities%20Class%20Actions%20Against%20Chinese%20Domiciled%20
Companies.pdf. Starting with the second half of 2013, market sentiment has visibly improved for
China-based stocks. The U.S. initial public offering (IPO) market seems to have thawed for Chinabased companies after an extended frozen period, with eight new listings completed in 2013 and more
reportedly in the pipeline for 2014. Rebecca Fannin, China Venture Capitalists and Entrepreneurs Set
to Get Boost from Improved IPO Outlook, Finally!, FORBES, Dec. 19, 2013, 2:21 PM, http://www.
forbes.com/sites/rebeccafannin/2013/12/19/china-venture-capitalists-and-entrepreneurs-set-to-getboost-from-improved-ipo-outlook-finally/.
12. See Weitseng Chen, Institutional Arbitrage: China’s Economic Power Projection and
International Capital Markets, 26 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. (forthcoming 2013) (“In practice, [private
placements under Rule 144A and Regulation S] have become the dominating mechanism for Chinese
firms and the Chinese government to gain access to U.S. capital.”).
13. In January 2014, an SEC administrative law judge suspended the Chinese units of the Big
Four accounting firms from auditing U.S.-traded companies for six months. Michael Rapoport, Judge
Suspends Chinese Units of Big Four Auditors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2014, 1:42 AM, http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303448204579337183810731744. If the ruling becomes final, it
could create significant obstacles for China-based companies to obtaining U.S. listings. The accounting
firms appealed the ruling in February 2014, but the review process within the SEC and potentially in a
court of appeals (if the SEC upholds the ruling and the firms seek further court review) could take a
long time (months at least for administrative review and years for judicial proceedings); as a result, the
ruling is not expected to take effect soon, if at all. Michael Rapoport, China Units of Big-Four Firms
Appeal Audit Ban, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2014, 5:47 PM, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014
24052702303704304579379410335942436.
14. See sources cited infra note 72.
15. See, e.g., China Probes Vice Public Security Chief amid Graft Crackdown, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Dec. 21, 2013), available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-12-20/china-probesdeputy-public-security-chief-amid-graft-crackdown.
16. Kevin LaCroix, Corruption Allegations: More Securities Suits Against U.S.-Listed Chinese
Companies?, D&O DIARY (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/09/articles/securitieslitigation/corruption-allegations-more-securities-suits-against-u-s-listed-chinese-companies/.

DAI MACRO(DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/22/2014 9:33 PM

DISCLOSING CHINA’S CORRUPTION RISKS

407

This Article discusses the ways in which securities disclosure
requirements can and should be used to potentially enhance investor
protections with respect to China’s corruption risks. In particular, it argues
that the current securities disclosure rules’ reliance on a standard-based
requirement for corruption risk disclosures is problematic; to address
certain practical challenges facing the parties involved in the disclosure
drafting process, a more specific rule-based directive that can be expected
to enhance due diligence and disclosure practices over corruption risks of
China-based securities should be adopted. Part I discusses the information
rationale for using risk disclosure to regulate corruption risks. Part II
describes the current disclosure requirement for corruption risks, which is
based on a materiality standard that leaves to the issuers the exercise of
considerable judgment over disclosure. Part III demonstrates the deficient
corruption risk disclosures made by China-based companies under the
standard-based requirement. Part IV discusses certain practical challenges
present in the disclosure drafting process that have contributed to the
deficient disclosures and due diligence of the corruption risks of Chinabased companies. Parts V and VI propose using a rule-based disclosure
requirement and preliminarily discuss possible objections to such a
proposal, respectively.
I. REGULATING CORRUPTION RISKS THROUGH INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE
When Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977, it gave the SEC civil
authority to enforce both the Act’s anti-bribery and accounting
provisions.17 Given the SEC’s traditional role as the chief regulator of the
capital markets, critics have questioned the appropriateness of having the
SEC enforce the FCPA, especially the anti-bribery provision.18 This
Article does not engage in similar debate about whether and how the SEC
and other regulators should fight overseas corruption in China through
enforcing substantive laws such as the FCPA. Instead, it proposes that the
SEC’s traditional regulatory toolkit, in particular the disclosure rules,
should not be overlooked when the Commission considers protecting
investors from corruption risks.

17. See Wallace L. Timmeny, SEC Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 25, 26–27 (1979) (noting that the SEC may use its civil enforcement
power under the Exchange Act and the SEC’s Rules of Practice to enforce the FCPA and related rules,
whereas the Department of Justice was not provided with civil investigative tools).
18. See, e.g., Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global
Corruption is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093 (2012) (challenging the SEC’s role
in enforcing FCPA).
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U.S. securities regulation fundamentally relies on disclosure
requirements and related liabilities to regulate investment risk issues. As
early as 1979, the SEC sought, though unsuccessfully, to bolster the
FCPA’s accounting provision through disclosure mechanisms that would
have imposed certain Sarbanes-Oxley-style requirements of internal control
reporting.19 Although such a requirement was ultimately incorporated into
the securities laws decades later,20 requirements for risk factor disclosures,
another avenue that the securities laws often pursue to regulate risks, have
not been afforded sufficient attention from lawmakers and regulators.
U.S. securities laws currently require domestic and foreign securities
issuers to disclose important risk factors affecting their operations and
prospects in the registration statements that contain their offering
prospectuses and also in periodic filings.21 In theory, there are at least two
important ways in which risk disclosure requirements could be used to
regulate securities investment risks and to protect investors. First, risk
disclosures could reduce information asymmetry in the market and enable
investors to make informed investment decisions.22 Second, mandatory
disclosure requirements might motivate corporate executives to implement
enhanced risk management.23 This Part considers the potential information
benefits of risk disclosures in the context of the corruption risks of Chinabased securities.
Although there have long been complaints that risk disclosures are
19. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN
REGULATION S-K 22 n.58 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosurerequirements-review.pdf.
20. See Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, Exchange Act Release
No. 47,986, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,068, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003).
21. In practice, due to liability management considerations, offering documents in connection
with non-registered transactions under Rule 144A and Regulation S also disclose risk factors because,
although Rule 144A and Regulation S offerings are not subject to the same mandatory disclosure
requirements imposed on registered offerings under the securities laws, they are not exempt from the
anti-fraud liability provisions. See ZE’-EV D. EIGER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
REGULATION S 21 (2013), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/FAQs-RegulationS.pdf (noting that, compared with a registered offering, a Rule 144A/Regulation S offering is subject to
more flexible disclosure requirements but that the anti-fraud provisions are still applicable). To
simplify discussion, this Article focuses on the risk disclosure requirements for companies and
securities registered with the SEC.
22. See Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary
Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 929–31 (noting that
investors use specialized forward-looking statements disclosed by issuers to evaluate risks of
investments).
23. See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 113, 123–25 (Summer 1999) (“Required disclosure . . . will make [the management] try harder
to avoid actions that will generate negative information.”).
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often meaningless boilerplates, the available empirical evidence
demonstrates that legally-required risk disclosures do have an impact on
the market perception of risks.24 For example, in a recent study,
researchers found a positive correlation between risk disclosures and postdisclosure trading patterns, suggesting that, on average, risk disclosures are
meaningful even under the current disclosure requirements.25 Furthermore,
studies have also shown that there is sound basis for the market to respond
to risk disclosures because issuers subject to the disclosure requirements
are generally motivated to produce risk information that corresponds to
their own risk assessment.26 Even if they do not have much faith in the
empirics, however, lawmakers and the SEC should consider risk disclosure
as a potentially useful mechanism for regulating securities risks by
informing investors.
Empirical studies on the market perception of the disclosure of
corruption risk factors have not been performed at this time. But relevant
considerations can still be debated and analyzed. Practitioners in the
United States disagree on whether corruption risk disclosures provide any
benefits to investors. For example, one lawyer criticized the typical FCPA
risk factor language as mostly superfluous, referencing as an example
Google’s filings.27 Specifically, such disclosure tends to state little more
than the obvious: that U.S. companies with foreign operations are subject to
the FCPA.28 In addition, the disclosing company tends to admit in such a
24. See, e.g., John L. Campbell et al., The Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor
Disclosures in Corporate Filings, 19 REV. ACCT. STUD. 396, 398 (2014) (finding a positive association
between risk factor disclosures and post-disclosure market beta and stock return volatility, suggesting
that investors incorporate risk disclosures into their assessments of firm risk and value); Todd Kravet &
Volkan Muslu, Textual Risk Disclosures and Investors’ Risk Perceptions, 18 REV. ACCT. STUD. 1088
(2013) (finding that changes in the number of risk sentences in disclosures correlate with investors’
assessments). But see Feng Li, Do Stock Market Investors Understand the Risk Sentiment of Corporate
Annual Reports? 5–6 (Univ. of Mich. Stephen M. Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2006), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=898181 (finding that when risk sentiment
increases, future earnings decrease, and investors underreact—or fail to react altogether—to the
disclosures); Yatin Mirakur, Risk Disclosure in SEC Corporate Filings (Univ. of Pa. Wharton Res.
Scholars J., Working Paper, 2011), available at http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1088&context=wharton_research_scholars (finding that risk disclosures do not accurately predict a
disclosing firm’s future events).
25. See Campbell et al., supra note 24.
26. Id.; see also Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, Litigation Risk and Voluntary Disclosure:
The Use of Meaningful Cautionary Language (2d Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies,
Working Paper, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998590
(showing that firms’ risk disclosure corresponds to the level of litigation risks that they face).
27. See Nicole Di Schino, When and How Companies Should Include FCPA Risk Disclosures in
SEC Filings, FCPA REP., Sept. 26, 2013, available at http://www.troutmansanders.com/files/Uploads/
Documents/brownfcparisksecfilings.pdf.
28. Id.
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risk factor that despite its efforts, the acts of its employees or of third
parties may still render it in violation of the law.29 Such practice was
criticized for unnecessarily raising question about the effectiveness of such
a company’s compliance program.30 But reasonable minds could certainly
differ. Since the FCPA does not apply to every U.S. publicly traded
company, the risk factors associated with the FCPA are in fact less
“generic” than some more universally applicable risk factors, such as that
of the potential absence of a trading market for new securities, that are
nevertheless recommended by the Commission.31 Furthermore, when a
company believes that it could be subject to the FCPA and as a result could
face the associated regulatory burdens and consequences, such a belief is
usually derived from legal advice. Reasonable investors would more than
likely appreciate if such private knowledge procured at cost were shared
with them and would take that information into consideration.
As for China-based companies, investors could conceivably benefit
even more from the corruption risk information that the issuer discloses.
Although China appears on the front pages of U.S. newspapers more
frequently now than ever before, the average U.S. investor still has much to
learn about corruption risks, such as the following: (i) China, and in
particular the industry in which an issuer operates, is susceptible to a high
level of corruption risk;32 (ii) an issuer may face high corruption risk due to
frequent contacts with government officials or business transactions with
government bodies;33 (iii) U.S.-incorporated issuers and foreign private
issuers are subject to the FCPA if they list securities in the United States;34
(iv) China-based issuers are also subject to PRC anti-corruption laws, and
the PRC authority launches enforcement campaigns from time to time;35 (v)
being subject to the FCPA could render the issuer less competitive than its

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. (Item 503) Prospectus Summary, Risk Factors, and Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges: Risk
Factors, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2013).
32. See, e.g., Bohai Pharm. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 30 (Sept. 27, 2013) (noting
that a series of corrupt practices occur from time to time in China as well as in the pharmaceutical
industry); Simcere Pharm. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 16 (Apr. 25, 2012) (noting that there
exists in the pharmaceutical industry a series of corrupt practices, such as the acceptance by hospitals
and medical practitioners of kickbacks, bribes, or other illegal gains or benefits from pharmaceutical
manufacturers and distributors); .
33. See, e.g., 21Vianet Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 18 (Apr. 18, 2012) (noting that
doing business with state or government-owned enterprises or government ministries places the
company in frequent contact with “foreign officials” under the FCPA).
34. See Bohai Pharm. Grp., Inc., supra note 32; cf. 21Vianet Grp., Inc., supra note 33
(acknowledging that the company is subject to the FCPA although it is a foreign private issuer).
35. See, e.g., Simcere Pharm. Grp., Inc., supra note 32.
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competitors in China that are not U.S.-listed companies;36 (vi) the issuer’s
compliance system, whether already in place or still being implemented or
improved, may nevertheless fail to ensure the compliance of employees or
of third parties with which the issuer deals;37 (vii) some issuers, while not
having the intent to bribe, gave gifts to government officials prior to
becoming public companies in the United States;38 (viii) failure to comply
with anti-corruption laws will expose the issuer to significant liabilities and
will harm its reputation, operations, and prospects.39
Not all companies discuss every item in this list in their risk factor
disclosures—if they even include one in their documents—since each could
be more appropriate for some issuers than others. Nevertheless, if the
securities laws could ensure that all China-based issuers assess the
foregoing aspects of corruption risks as applied to them and consider
disclosing accordingly, the overall information made available to investors
(especially information specific to an issuer’s industry and private
knowledge subtly revealed “between the lines,” such as “prior gifting”)
might be very rich. Not only would investors learn about each China-based
company’s corruption risks in the handy format of SEC filings, but they
could also more easily compare corruption risk profiles across companies.
Although further empirical evidence is wanting, risk disclosure
requirements in securities regulations should be seriously considered by the
SEC in order to protect investors from the corruption risks of China-based
securities.
II. THE STANDARD-BASED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT FOR
CORRUPTION RISKS
The current legal requirement for corruption risk disclosures can be
viewed as a standard rather than a rule. A rule typically provides clear and
specific guidance ex ante regarding permissible behavior; a standard, in
comparison, looks mushy and flexible before the act and is often given
content specific to the relevant factual circumstances by the adjudicator ex
post.40 As a result, in choosing a course of action ex ante under a standard36. See, e.g., Bohai Pharm. Grp., Inc., supra note 32; China Kanghui Holdings, Annual Report
(Form 20-F) 19 (June 3, 2011).
37. See e.g., 21Vianet Grp., Inc., supra note 33; Simcere Pharm. Grp., Inc., supra note 32.
38. See, e.g., Keyuan Petrochemicals, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 38 (Apr. 13, 2012)
(disclosing that the company had, prior to going public in the United States, given small gifts to
government officials during spring festivals, which it believed would not trigger criminal liability under
the PRC law).
39. See, e.g., supra notes 32–38.
40. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559
(1992) (“Arguments about and definitions of rules and standards commonly emphasize the distinction
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based legal norm, an agent could face considerable uncertainty and,
therefore, can be expected to exercise a greater amount of judgment than
when acting under a rule.
The disclosure requirement for corruption risk under U.S. securities
regulations is standard-based: there is no specific directive applicable to
this issue. As previously noted, risk factor disclosures are a required
component of registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 (the
Securities Act)41 and of annual and quarterly filings under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).42 The SEC adopted
separate but similar risk factor disclosure requirements, which are
applicable to domestic issuers and to foreign private issuers in Item 503(c)
of Regulation S-K and Item 3.D. of Form 20-F, respectively.43 Aside from
the general requirements that the most significant risks should be disclosed
and that generic risks, or “risks that could apply to any issuer or any
offering,” should be avoided,44 Regulation S-K and Form 20-F offer very
limited concrete guidance about which risks to disclose. Each does provide
a few examples of possible risks that issuers “may” consider including,45

between whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post.”). For a good summary of the “rule versus
standard” debate in the constitutional law context, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–69 (1992).
41. See (Item 503) Prospectus Summary, Risk Factors, and Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges:
Risk Factors, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2013); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 1852, FORM 20-F:
REGISTRATION FORM/ANNUAL REPORT/TRANSITION REPORT Item 3.D (2012) [hereinafter FORM 20-F];
see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 1981, FORM F-1: REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (2008) [hereinafter FORM F-1] (requiring disclosure in accordance with Form
20-F); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 870, FORM S-1: REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (2008) [hereinafter FORM S-1] (requiring disclosure in accordance with
Regulation S-K).
42. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c), Item 3.D; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 1673, FORM 10-K:
ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
(2012) [hereinafter FORM 10-K] (requiring disclosure per Item 503(c)); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
SEC 1296, FORM 10-Q: GENERAL FORM FOR QUARTERLY REPORTS UNDER SECTION 13 OR 15(D)
(2012) [hereinafter FORM 10-Q] (also requiring such disclosure); FORM 20-F, supra note 41.
43. See § 229.503(c); FORM 20-F, supra note 41.
44. § 229.503(c). The instruction for Item 3.D. of Form 20-F also requires that “[r]isk factors
should be concise and explain clearly how the risk affects the issuer or the securities.” FORM 20-F,
supra note 41.
45. See § 229.503(c) (suggesting that risk factors may include the issuer’s “lack of an operating
history,” its “lack of profitable operations in recent periods,” its “financial position,” its “business or
proposed business,” and its “lack of a market for [its] common equity securities or securities convertible
into or exercisable for common equity securities”); FORM 20-F, supra note 41 (instructing a foreign
private issuer to consider disclosing risks such as “the nature of the business in which it is engaged or
proposes to engage; factors relating to the countries in which it operates; the absence of profitable
operations in recent periods; the financial position of the company; the possible absence of a liquid
trading market for the company’s securities; reliance on the expertise of management; potential
dilution; unusual competitive conditions; pending expiration of material patents, trademarks or
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but corruption risk is not mentioned in those examples.46
Consequently, whether an issuer should disclose corruption risks turns
on materiality: the classic standard-based norm in securities regulation that
is generally applicable to disclosure issues.47 Factual information is
material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”48
Where the SEC has stopped short of using its rulemaking power to
predetermine for issuers which information is important and relevant to
investors and therefore worth disclosing, issuers are left with the
materiality analysis, which is often open-ended and highly fact-specific.49
So far there has not been any court decision on the specific topic of
corruption risk disclosure.50
While issuers’ discretion is limited by the potential liabilities they face
if they omit material information, there is considerable room for them to
decide ex ante about whether corruption risks are material enough for
disclosure and to argue that determination ex post. By analogizing to
similar judicial decisions and other authorities, sound arguments that
corruption risk factors are material can be made.51 Counterarguments may
contracts; or dependence on a limited number of customers or suppliers”).
46. See § 229.503(c); FORM 20-F, supra note 41, Item 3.D.
47. 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.9 (6th ed. 2009).
48. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011) (quoting Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988)). The SEC also affirmed this standard. See Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211).
49. See, e.g., Additional Information, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408(a) (2013) (“In addition to the
information expressly required to be included in a registration statement, there shall be added such
further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.”); Additional Information, 17 C.F.R. §
240.12b–20 (2013) (“In addition to the information expressly required to be included in a statement or
report, there shall be added such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the
required statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are made not misleading.”).
50. For a doctrinal analysis of the viability of securities fraud claims over the disclosure of
China’s country risks in general, see Peter M. Friedman, Note, Risky Business: Can Faulty Country
Risk Factors in the Prospectuses of U.S. Listed Chinese Companies Raise Violations of U.S. Securities
Law?, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 241, 264–73 (2005) (“[A] strong case can be made that in certain
cases, Chinese issuers, their officers, their underwriters, and their lawyers could face civil liability
under the Securities Act’s Section 11.”).
51. For example, the court has previously decided that facts pertaining to management integrity
are likely to be deemed material. See HAZEN, supra note 47, § 12.9[3][B]. Also, according to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s formulation, which is also accepted by some
other courts, material facts may “include . . . those facts which affect the probable future of the
company and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company’s
securities.” E.g., Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 832 F.2d 726, 732 (2d Cir. 1987); SEC v.
Mize, 615 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1980); Northway, Inc. v. TSC Industries, Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 331
(7th Cir. 1975); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 764 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf
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nevertheless point out that the SEC’s materiality standard focuses much
more on the disclosure of quantifiable information rather than nonquantifiable factors, such as corruption risks.52 Moreover, issuers have
long been advised that they do not have a per se obligation to disclose even
a material fact absent affirmative regulatory requirement.53
Thinking in relatively abstract terms, allowing issuers discretion on
corruption risk disclosures under the materiality standard could produce a
“signaling game.”54 As issuers have different corruption risk profiles, the
efficient equilibrium in such a signaling game, at which high-risk issuers
disclose a greater amount of risk information and low-risk issuers disclose
less or no risk information, could be reached. Assuming that securities
regulations use risk factors to make riskier securities less attractive to
investors than less risky ones,55 achieving such a “separating equilibrium”
would attest to the efficacy of securities law and in particular to the
materiality standard. In reality, however, there is no evidence of honest
signaling in this context. Potential liabilities for faulty disclosures may
render honest signaling costly and thus may create incentives for it. As
mentioned, however, liabilities for omitting corruption risks are far from
certain. Moreover, as Part IV will describe, there may be other incentives
that could counter the incentives created by legal liabilities. Consequently,
as the next Part shows, in reality, not all China-based companies are
disclosing corruption risks upon careful assessment of their respective
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968). Information typically included in corruption risk factors
does appear to be material according to such jurisprudence. See supra Part I. Furthermore, since 1976,
the SEC has taken the position that “even if questionable or illegal payments are not quantitatively
material, disclosure of such payments may be required because of their bearing on management’s
competency or integrity.” Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management
Integrity and Competency, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 581 (1981). In addition, while some may argue that
China’s corruption issues are widely reported and that whether corruption risk disclosure may really
alter the “total mix” of information available to investors is an open question, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York has, in fact, in a recent case rejected a similar argument for
immateriality. See In re Fuwei Films Sec. Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 419, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that
pre-IPO disclosures in a Chinese language news article did not render subsequent non-disclosure
immaterial).
52. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse
Incomplete Disclosure Under the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 24–25 (2011).
53. HAZEN, supra note 47, § 12.9[1]; see also STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 45 (2d ed. 2008) (“[T]here is no general duty to disclose all
material information . . . .”).
54. For a classic description of the signaling game, including the concepts of separating
equilibrium, semi-pooling equilibrium, and pooling equilibrium referenced in this Article, see generally
A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED
SCREENING PROCESSES 92–97 (1974).
55. THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 110–11 (6th ed. 2003).
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exposure. From the perspective of investor protection, that can be quite
problematic.
III. DEFICIENT DISCLOSURE
This Part presents some general observations on the disclosure
practices adopted by China-based companies with respect to corruption
risks. Public filing searches, which can be inherently crude and
incomplete, were used to observe patterns in available disclosures that are
sufficiently revealing for the mission of this Article.56 As the following
shows, the standard-based disclosure requirement has instead resulted in a
“semi-pooling” equilibrium.
A. Who Discloses?
There are a number of China-based companies that have made
corruption risk disclosures. These disclosing companies mainly include
pharmaceutical companies, “backdoor-listed” companies, and a small
number of companies that went public through a conventional IPO process.
Pharmaceutical and medical service companies are more likely to
include a corruption risk factor in their IPO and periodic filings.57 The
disclosure is likely driven by the widely-held perception that China’s
pharmaceutical industry is subject to rampant corrupt practices and
persistent government scrutiny and crackdown.58
56. Specifically, Westlaw’s EDGAR Filing search tool was used to perform searches for filings
on Form F-1, Form 20-F, Form S-1, and Form 10-K, with alternative search terms of “China /20
corrupt!” and China /20 brib!.” As of the latest search date of December 21, 2013, the first search
yielded 1324 documents and the second 766 documents. Those results are expected to include at least
the vast majority of SEC filings by both China-based companies and multinationals that may have
mentioned China’s corruption issues. To confirm negative findings (i.e., firms that have not disclosed
corruption risks), EDGAR pages for the relevant companies on the SEC website have also been doublechecked.
57. See, e.g., China Kanghui Holdings, Prospectus (Form 424B4) 26–27 (Aug. 11, 2010); China
Nuokang Bio-Pharm. Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 28 (Dec. 10, 2009); Simcere Pharm. Grp.,
Prospectus (Form 424B4) 18–19 (Apr. 20, 2007); Mindray Med. Int’l Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4)
10 (Sept. 27, 2006). But see ShangPharma Corp., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Oct. 19, 2010) (neglecting
to mention corruption anywhere in its filings).
58. See Mindray Med. Int’l Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20–F) (Apr. 8, 2013) (“Due to the
conditions of competition in the markets for medical devices in China . . . [Mindray] believe[s] that
corrupt practices may still occur . . . . [including] inappropriate and unlawful payments or favors to
influence procurement decision of customers, regulatory approval decisions of the China Food and
Drug Administration, or CFDA, and clinical trials conducted by Chinese hospitals and medical
institutions. . . . [Despite the company’s compliance efforts, it or its distributors may still violate antibribery laws in various jurisdictions, for which it] could be required to pay damages or fines, which
could materially and adversely affect [its] financial condition and results of operations. In addition, [its]
brand and reputation, [its] sales activities or the price of [its] ADSs could be adversely affected if [the]
company becomes the target of any negative publicity as a result of actions taken by [the company] or

DAI MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

416

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/22/2014 9:33 PM

[Vol 24:403

Many smaller and more obscure companies that obtained their U.S.
listings through so-called “reverse mergers” instead of a conventional IPO
process59 also disclose corruption risks. Companies in this group span a
wide range of industries.60 Consistent with empirical studies linking
greater risk disclosures with higher litigation risks, such “backdoor-listed”
companies may be advised to include corruption risk factors as protection
against the growing hostility towards such companies since 2011.61
Finally, a few better-known companies that went public through
underwritten IPOs have disclosed or have just started to disclose corruption
risks in filings. For example, two hardware solution providers in the
information technology sector, 21Vianet Group, Inc. and ChinaCache
International Holdings Ltd., have included corruption risk factor
disclosures in their documents.62 The disclosures of both companies are
almost identical,63 and the language suggests that substantial government
contracting by each of the companies is the major concern driving the
disclosure.64 It is less clear why in 2013 Xinyuan Real Estate Co., Ltd., a
China-based real estate company listed in New York, added a corruption

[its] distributors.”).
59. For a general introduction to these Chinese reverse merger companies, see generally Janelle
A. McCarty, Note, Mergers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing and Corporate Disclosure Standards
Indirectly on Trial in the United States, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 347 (2012).
60. Such companies are in the pharmaceutical, food, manufacturing, petrochemical, and waste
recycling industries, among others. See e.g., Bohai Pharm. Grp., Inc., supra note 32; China Advanced
Constr. Materials Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20 (Sept. 25, 2013); China Xuefeng Envtl. Eng’g
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Sept. 11, 2013); Keyuan Petrochemicals Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) 38 (June 5, 2013); Asia Green Agric. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20 (Mar. 29,
2013).
61. For background on the hostility against such companies, see McCarty, supra note 59, at 354–
55; see also David M. Katz, Chinese Reverse Mergers Spawned U.S. Class Actions, Report Says, CFO,
May 22, 2012, http://www3.cfo.com/article/2012/5/m-a_reverse-mergers-china-firms-class-actioncornerstone-research-heli-electronics.
62. See 21Vianet Grp., Inc., supra note 33; ChinaCache Int’l Holdings Ltd., Annual Report (Form
20–F) 14 (Apr. 26, 2013).
63. ChinaCache apparently modeled its risk factor disclosure on 21Vianet Group’s after
ChinaCache decided to include such a risk factor in its 2012 annual report filing. 21Vianet has had
such a risk factor since its IPO prospectus in 2011. See 21Vianet Grp., Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4)
22 (Apr. 21, 2011); ChinaCache Int’l Holdings Ltd., supra note 62.
64. See 21Vianet Grp., supra note 33, at 16 (“[21Vianet] operate[s] in the data center services
industry in China and generally purchase[s] [its] hosting facilities and telecommunications resources
from state or government-owned enterprises and sell[s] [its] services domestically to customers that
include state or government-owned enterprises or government ministries, departments and agencies.
This puts [it] in frequent contact with persons who may be considered ‘foreign officials’ under the
FCPA, resulting in an elevated risk of potential FCPA violations.”); see also ChinaCache Int’l Holdings
Ltd., supra note 62 (acknowledging similar issues in the content and application delivery services
industry).
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risk disclosure to both its 2012 annual report65 and a prospectus filed on
Form F-3.66 In addition, China Commercial Credit, Inc., a small credit firm
incorporated in Delaware that went public in August 2013, disclosed a risk
factor that only concerns FCPA.67
The reasons China-based companies choose to disclose corruption
risks can be further speculated upon, but that is not the focus of this Article.
It suffices to say that the above information suggests that at least some
China-based companies signal their higher corruption risk exposure to
investors.
B. Who Does Not Disclose?
Many well-known China-based companies have never disclosed
corruption risk factors. Such non-disclosing companies include, for
example, large state-controlled enterprises (SCEs) in heavily regulated
sectors such as oil and gas, energy, telecommunications, railroads, and
airlines.68 PetroChina Co. Ltd. (PetroChina), the New York- and Hong
Kong-cross-listed unit of China’s state-owned oil and gas giant, China
National Petroleum Corp., is a good example of an SCE that faces
exceptionally high risks of corruption. Not only does PetroChina operate
in the highly regulated oil and gas industry, which involves frequent
contacts with domestic and foreign government authorities and other statebacked counterparties, but its management and employees may also be
deemed government officials under both the PRC Criminal Law69 and the
FCPA.70 Despite PetroChina’s potentially significant exposure, it has
never warned investors in its filings about the corruption risks inherent in
its operations.71 This potential disclosure deficiency is more significant
since late August 2013, when Chinese authorities initiated corruption
investigations against several former and then-incumbent senior executives
65. See Xinyuan Real Estate Co., Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 30 (Apr. 15, 2013).
66. See Xinyuan Real Estate Co., Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B3) 19 (Nov. 18, 2013).
67. See China Commercial Credit, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 24 (Aug. 14. 2013).
68. See, e.g., China Mobile Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 25, 2013); China Unicom
(Hong Kong) Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 25, 2013); Guangshen Ry. Co. Ltd., Annual
Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 24, 2013); China Petroleum & Chem. Corp., Annual Report (Form 20-F)
(Apr. 11, 2013); Huaneng Power Int’l Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 17, 2013).
69. Article 93 of the PRC Criminal Law provides that state officials include persons carrying out
public functions in state-owned companies. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa (中华人民共和国
刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] art. 93 (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the
President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Mar. 14, 1997), 1997 STANDING
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 138.
70. The FCPA’s definition of “foreign officials” has been interpreted liberally to cover employees
of state-owned companies. Warin et al., supra note 1, at 44.
71. See, e.g., PetroChina Co. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 26, 2013).
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of PetroChina, leading to declines in share prices in both New York and
Hong Kong.72 In September 2013, investors filed two securities class
action complaints against PetroChina in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, alleging that PetroChina had made false
and misleading statements and had failed to disclose material facts with
respect to its corruption issues.73 Other New York-listed large Chinese
SCEs such as Sinopec74 and China Mobile,75 which have also experienced
turmoil in recent years due to corruption investigations, have not disclosed
any corruption risks either.
SCEs are not alone in adopting a non-disclosure approach for
corruption risks. Many privately owned companies that went public
through conventional IPOs do not mention either general or specific
corruption risks facing their operations in China.76 Many of these
companies operate in the high-tech sector,77 which may be perceived as

72. On the day the news broke, PetroChina’s NYSE-traded American depositary declined by 4%.
PetroChina Falls as Corruption Probe Expanded, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK NEWS, Aug. 28, 2013,
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-08-28/petrochina-falls-as-corruption-probe-expanded.
PetroChina’s Hong Kong-listed shares dropped by 4.4% following a one-day suspension. Isabella
Steger & Mia Lamar, PetroChina Loses $1 Billion in Market Value, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2013, 5:16
AM ET, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323324904579040200172694292.
73. See Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws at 2–6, Hsu v.
Petrochina Co., No. 13 Civ. 6274 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2013); Class Action Complaint for Violations of
the Federal Securities Laws at 2–4, Broux v. Petrochina Co., No. 13 CV 6180 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2013)
[hereinafter Broux Complaint].
74. In 2009, Sinopec’s former chairman was convicted of bribery. Shai Oster, Sinopec Ex-chief
Convicted of Graft, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009, at A.8, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB124764264846943917.
75. Since 2010, China Mobile, the largest state-owned telecommunications operator, has counted
14 senior executives prosecuted or convicted for corruption-related crimes, including one in a recent
investigation initiated around the same time as the PetroChina probe. Liao Zhijie, Chen Yong & Wu
Qiaofa (廖志杰, 陈勇, 吴侨发), Zhong Yi Dong Fan Fu Si Nian Shi Si Ren Luo Ma: Chuan Nei Bu
Ming Dan Shang Wei Zhua Wan (中移动反腐四年14人落马: 传内部名单尚未抓完) [Four Years of
Anti-corruption Campaign Counted 14 Fallen Executives in China Mobile: The Prosecution Is Likely to
Continue] Xin Lang Ke Ji (新浪科技) [SINA TECH.] (Aug. 24, 2013, 05:27), http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/
2013-08-24/05278671558.shtml.
76. For example, only one of the eight companies that completed an IPO in 2013 included a
corruption risk factor in its prospectus. See China Commercial Credit, Inc., supra note 67. None of the
others included similar disclosure language. See Autohome Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Dec. 11,
2013); 500.com Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Nov. 22, 2013); Sungy Mobile Ltd., Prospectus (Form
424B4) (Nov. 22, 2013); Qunar Cayman Is. Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Nov. 1, 2013); 58.com
Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Oct. 31,2013); Montage Tech. Grp. Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4)
(Sept. 26, 2013); LightInTheBox Holding Co., Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (June 6, 2013).
77. One account done in April 2012 shows that the largest group of China-based companies listed
in the United States were from the technology sector. See Yingjie Zhang, The Study on the Entry
Mechanisms by Chinese Companies to the U.S. Market 15 (May 17, 2012) (unpublished B.S. thesis,
State University of New York at Albany), available at http://www.albany.edu/honorscollege/files/
Zhang_Thesis_Final.pdf.
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relatively less susceptible to corruption. But some of these companies
operate in more vulnerable industries, including resources and mining,78
renewable energy,79 insurance,80 machinery and equipment,81 education,82
media,83 and state-sponsored lotteries,84 which are highly regulated and
involve considerable government contacts in daily operations. There is a
strong case for the latter group to disclose corruption risks.
C. A “Semi-Pooling” Equilibrium
As the preceding sections suggest, it is possible that quite a number of
China-based companies with high corruption risks, including both SCEs
and privately owned companies, have chosen not to warn their investors
about such risks. Therefore, the equilibrium for the signaling game of risk
disclosure under the materiality standard seems to be “semi-pooling,” at
which some high-risk issuers are sending the same messages to investors as
low-risk issuers. Normally, an investor may expect to be able to
differentiate the corruption risk exposure of, for example, a large SCE such
as PetroChina from that of an online social network operator by comparing
risk disclosures. But at this equilibrium, the investors may not find this a
straightforward task since neither company includes any corruption risk
disclosures.
This is, of course, not to say that reasonable investors would be
unduly naïve to think it plausible that the SCE and the internet company
hold the same good faith belief that they face immaterial corruption issues.
Instead, non-disclosure by otherwise high-risk companies could be
interpreted by investors as a signal of such companies’ private knowledge
that even visibly serious corruption risks in their industry are unlikely to
have any quantifiably significant impact on them. From the perspective of
outside investors, those companies, by not disclosing risk factors, could be
signaling their “inside assessment” about how China’s anti-corruption
campaigns work and their justifiable confidence in their capability of
managing the process without damages. In hindsight, however, signals as
such are most often misleading for the investors. The failure of high-risk
China-based companies to disclose corruption risks and the presence of the

78. See, e.g., Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 27, 2012).
79. See, e.g., China Ming Yang Wind Power Grp. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 30,
2012); Yingli Green Energy Holding Co. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 26, 2012).
80. See, e.g., CNINSURE Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 24, 2012).
81. See, e.g., WSP Holdings Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 30, 2012).
82. See, e.g., New Oriental Educ. & Tech. Grp. Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Oct. 12, 2012).
83. See, e.g., Phoenix New Media Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 27, 2012).
84. See, e.g., 500.com Ltd., supra note 76.
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semi-pooling equilibrium suggest that the standard-based requirement is
not effective for the disclosure of corruption risks.
IV. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN DISCLOSURE DRAFTING
Practitioners have debated whether it is necessary or prudent for U.S.
public companies with international operations to include risk factor
language on FCPA compliance issues.85 While some believe that the
regulatory burdens and liability risks that the FCPA imposes on companies
are significant enough to merit a risk factor,86 others are skeptical about the
benefits.87 The PetroChina case described earlier seems to support the
more cautious stance. In one complaint, plaintiffs alleged that PetroChina
“made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1)
the Company’s senior officials were in non-compliance with the
Company’s corporate governance directives and code of ethics . . . (4) the
Company lacked adequate internal and financial controls . . . .”88 If
PetroChina had even included a general risk factor to balance its disclosure
about compliance, it may have at least benefitted from having an easier
argument against the plaintiffs.
Commentators speculate that China’s ongoing anti-corruption
campaign could place the securities disclosures of many more China-based
companies under close scrutiny like that of PetroChina.89 Until that
actually happens, however, the perceived benefits of easier risk
management may not provide adequate incentive for better corruption risk
disclosure due to the challenges in the practical process of disclosure
drafting discussed above, which lead many companies to avoid mentioning
corruption in their disclosure documents.
This Part discusses such challenges, drawing primarily from
observations on the ground.90 Two useful preliminary notes should be
made here to clarify some definitional issues. First, although securities
information is primarily required to be disclosed by corporate issuers, the
typical process of disclosure drafting often involves professional

85. See Di Schino, supra note 27, at 6 (noting that the necessity and prudence of disclosing in
filings that a company is subject to the FCPA is unsettled).
86. Id. at 7.
87. Id. at 8 (quoting Claudius Sokenu, a partner at Shearman & Sterling LLP) (“[I]f [a] company
has an FCPA problem down the road, I’m not really sure what pointing to that general risk factor gets
the company.”).
88. Broux Complaint, supra note 73, at 4.
89. LaCroix, supra note 16.
90. These observations are based on the author’s previous practice experience and discussions
with other lawyers specializing in capital markets transactions and securities compliance work.

DAI MACRO(DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/22/2014 9:33 PM

DISCLOSING CHINA’S CORRUPTION RISKS

421

intermediaries, such as outside lawyers and independent accountants.
Where disclosure documents are being prepared for offering transactions,
disclosure decisions also reflect significant inputs from investment banks
that serve as underwriters of the relevant offerings and thus can be held
liable for statements made in the disclosure documents. Due to the lack of
both knowledge and language proficiency, most China-based companies
have relied on professional intermediaries for disclosure drafting to a much
greater extent than U.S.-based public companies typically do. As a result,
disclosure decisions need to be understood in the context of the incentives
and behavior of both the issuers and the professional intermediaries
involved in the drafting process.
Second, while companies draft securities disclosures, including risk
disclosures, for both offering transactions and periodic filings, this Part
focuses on examining the dynamics of disclosure drafting in the former
context, mainly for the purpose of economizing the discussion, since all
important factors can be found in the transactional context but not
necessarily in the periodic filing context. For example, the disclosure
incentives for underwriters can be observed only in transactions. In
addition, as a practical matter, China-based companies review disclosure
issues much more closely in the transactional context. Risk factors drafted
during the transactional process are also likely to be adopted and to remain
“sticky” (i.e., virtually unchanged, even where language adjustment is
appropriate) in periodic filings, especially for many China-based issuers
that have short listing histories.91
A. Issuer Disincentives
China-based issuers typically face considerable disincentives to
mention corruption risks in their public disclosure documents, especially in
securities offering documents. Both corporate issuers and underwriters
want the best possible pricing in offering transactions. Issuers, as advised
by many investment banking professionals in China, still believe that the
negative connotations of risks could hamper marketing efforts92 and should
be avoided absent clear legal mandates. Furthermore, many Chinese
91. The stickiness of risk factor information in China-based company filings has also been
analyzed as it relates to country risks in general. See Friedman, supra note 50, at 245–55 (finding that
many China-based issuers made little change to country risk languages in their filings between mid1990 and 2005 despite significant changes in underlying circumstances in China).
92. Although many practicing lawyers tend to dismiss such concerns when raised by issuers and
underwriters in transactions, recent empirical evidence suggests that a negative disclosure tone indeed
affects cost of capital and firm value.
See Campbell et al., supra note 24, at 399
(“[N]egative/pessimistic disclosure increases cost of capital when a combined set of information
sources is analyzed . . . .”).

DAI MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

422

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/22/2014 9:33 PM

[Vol 24:403

issuers, including but definitely not limited to SCEs, are reluctant to
disclose corruption risks due to the fear of such disclosure’s potential
practical ramifications within China. Many companies see no point in
inviting the Chinese government’s closer scrutiny by putting on record that
their business faces high corruption risks. Companies that conduct
business or otherwise interact frequently with government bodies also raise
concerns at drafting meetings that valuable or critical business relationships
could be risked if they imply or even insinuate in public documents that
corrupt practices may exist in their dealings with government
counterparties.
B. Lack of Due Diligence Opportunities
Corporate and securities law scholarship has extensively discussed the
supposed “gatekeeper” role that professional intermediaries play in
complex business transactions such as securities offerings.93 Typically, the
negative consequences of potential legal liabilities and loss of reputation
should make intermediaries more risk-averse than their clients on
compliance matters such as disclosure. Nevertheless, in China-based
securities transactions, professional intermediaries involved in the
disclosure drafting process, such as underwriters and lawyers, also face
weighty practical considerations against disclosing corruption risks.
Generally, investment banks’ internal policies place considerable emphasis
on controlling anti-corruption compliance risks in connection with their
securities underwriting business.94 Bankers and the lawyers running
transactions on the ground, however, have extremely limited means to
conduct meaningful anti-corruption due diligence with China-based issuer
clients. Market-accepted diligence practice usually consists of no more
than one highly formalistic Q&A session with the issuer’s management,
which is unlikely to catch any “red flags.”95 Basic background checks are
routinely performed through web searches, which usually reveal few

93. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The
Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); Andrew F. Tuch,
Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583 (2010).
94. See, e.g., Wendy Wysong, Why, Whether and When the FCPA Matters in Capital Market
Transactions: The Asian Perspective, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Mar. 5, 2014), available at http://
www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/why-whether-and-when-the-fcpa-matters-in-capital-markettransactions-the-asian-perspective/ (noting that investment banks’ concern about FCPA risks has been
rising in Asian capital markets transactions).
95. Typically, questions are framed in a “yes or no” fashion, seeking the knowledge of the
management about potential compliance issues. Management expectedly answers “no” to all questions
without explaining much further.
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notable prior issues on the record.
More thorough independent
investigations are believed to be performed much less often than before, as
such investigations have become increasingly risky in China.96 Without the
benefit of adequate and meaningful due diligence opportunities, the
underwriters and lawyers have little basis on which to advise in favor of
disclosure.
Over the years, the transactional dynamic has become increasingly
issuer-dominated due to intensified competition for securities underwriting
business in China’s market.97 Transactions underwritten by more than two
lead banks have become the norm, and issuers are often not hesitant to fire
or change underwriters even just before their deals launch. Although
Chinese issuers still rely heavily on professionals to put together the
necessary paperwork, they tend to treat underwriters and lawyers as
functionaries rather than “gatekeepers,” and they are not inclined to
concede to the professionals on sensitive diligence and disclosure issues.98
These dynamics are particularly unfavorable for corruption risk diligence
and disclosure. Any underwriter in the syndicate will certainly find it silly
to push the issuer “too hard” on corruption risk diligence and disclosure
while letting its competitor win the client’s favor by being “reasonable.”99
As diligence and disclosure have become much harder to obtain from
the issuers, the investment banks have tended to fall back on other
conventional risk management tools available to underwriters, such as
issuer representations and warranties in the underwriting agreement and the
“10b-5/disclosure letter” provided by lawyers. These tools, however, are
not a perfect substitute for due diligence, as they afford no direct protection
96. See, e.g., Jane Perlez, In China, the Dangers of Due Diligence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/business/global/china-hems-in-private-sleuths-seekingfraud.html?_r=0 (reporting incidents illustrating challenges and dangers, including the risk of criminal
prosecutions, facing business investigators in China).
97. As the recent media report on and SEC investigations of J.P. Morgan’s hiring practices in
China revealed, competition has even driven the international investment banks to engage in
questionable conduct themselves. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, On Defensive, JPMorgan
Hired China’s Elite, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 29, 2013, 9:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/12/29/on-defensive-jpmorgan-hired-chinas-elite/
(documenting
J.P.
Morgan’s
internal
communications, which revealed its program to hire children of government officials for the purpose of
competing with other investment banks for mandates).
98. Similar phenomenon and the negative consequences thereof have been noticed in general in
business transactions with multiple “gatekeepers.” See Tuch, supra note 93, at 1604 (describing the
troubling prospect that a corporate issuer may interpose itself between the various professional
gatekeepers so that none of them can effectively monitor such issuer).
99. Cf. supra Part III.A (noting that the filings of many “backdoor-listed” China-based companies
and of tiny IPO companies such as China Commercial Credit often include corruption risk language,
probably because such smaller companies have much less leverage over their financial and legal
advisors and tend to largely defer to them on disclosure issues).
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to the investors that are not parties to the documents. In addition, negative
assurance provided in a law firm’s 10b-5 letter is based on the relevant
lawyers’ actual subjective belief, which is inherently limited by the scope
of their substantive inquiries.100 Furthermore, also as a result of
competition, China-based issuers have become much less receptive to
terms contained in investment banks’ allegedly “form” underwriting
agreements, and many have attempted to cut back the more robust
representations and warranties contained in the underwriting agreement.101
C. Market Norm and Group Think
Disclosure drafting practice has a highly conformist aspect. In
particular, where the standard-based disclosure requirement offers little
specific guidance, disclosure drafters often reference market practices.102
Although some have noted that “group think” seems to steer U.S.-based
issuers towards including FCPA risk language in filings,103 for China-based
companies, the collective force has moved in the opposite direction. As a
good number of non-disclosing issuers can be found on the market, nondisclosure has become the market norm, the deviation from which is
generally discouraged. This norm makes it easier for the issuers to
rationalize their preference for non-disclosure and makes it harder for
underwriters and lawyers to request that issuers cooperate with enhanced
corruption risk due diligence and disclosure where appropriate. Chinabased issuers often take such a pro-disclosure stance by the professional
intermediaries as a lack of trust, especially if those parties have a prior
record of working for other China-based companies that do not disclose
100. Subcommittee on Securities Law Opinions, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
ABA Section of Business Law, Report, Negative Assurance in Securities Offerings (2008 Revision), 64
BUS. LAW. 395, 403 (2009); see also Tuch, supra note 93, at 1657 (noting an “apparent gap in
liability . . . concern[ing] the basis of knowledge on which lawyers’ negative assurance [in the 10b-5
letters] rests.”).
101. See Youku.com Inc., Form of Underwriting Agreement (Form F-1/A, Ex-1.1) § 1(a)(lxviii)
(Dec. 3, 2010) (illustrating “clean” representation language, without a knowledge qualifier, in the
issuer’s representation on anti-corruption law in a securities underwriting/purchase agreement, which is
rare); see also Sungy Mobile Ltd., Underwriting Agreement (Form F-1/A, Ex.-1.1) § 2(1)(xliii) (Nov.
20, 2013) (illustrating that the knowledge qualifier can sometimes expand to apply to directors and
officers, which is arguably not “market”); Baidu.com, Inc., Underwriting Agreement (Form F-1/A, Ex1.1) § 1(a)(lxxviii) (Aug. 4, 2005) (illustrating that the knowledge qualifier can sometimes expand to
apply to the issuer itself, which is arguably not “market”). More aggressive cutbacks on anti-corruption
representation language by the issuers have been seen in non-registered deals, but the
underwriting/purchase agreements are not publicly available.
102. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure Practice,
80 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (describing certain network effects in disclosure practices that involve
attorneys looking to the market standard disclosure practices as an indicator of the required disclosures).
103. Di Schino, supra note 27, at 5–6.
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corruption risks. They also think that much of the requested diligence and
disclosure is greater than the market standard and not legally required and
that it simply serves the professional intermediaries’ interest in managing
their own exposure. Issuers are unlikely to be sympathetic to such
disclosure advice, especially if any additional diligence or disclosure puts
strains on the often ultra-tight transaction timeline or if it potentially affects
the deal’s marketing prospects.
V. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT WITH A RULE-BASED
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
The practical dynamics in the disclosure drafting process create
considerable counterforces to the interest of issuers and intermediaries in
due diligence and a more adequate disclosure of corruption risks.
Consequently, investors have lost the benefit of not only accurate
information with which to evaluate risk but also potentially better risk
management that might result from greater attention and from measures
adopted as a result of adequate due diligence and disclosure analysis.
This Article proposes to replace the materiality standard with a rulebased requirement for the disclosure of corruption risks. Unlike the
standard-based requirement, a rule-based disclosure requirement would
remove much of the discretion of the issuer, as advised by professional
intermediaries, over the disclosure of specified information.
The “rule versus standard” dichotomy, however, consists of possible
middle points between the “pure” forms at the two extremes. Some
disclosure requirements in the form of a rule may nevertheless have a
materiality component. For example, Item 5.A. of Form 20-F requires
foreign private issuers to “[d]escribe the impact of inflation, if material.”104
Similarly, a standard-based requirement can also incorporate rule-like
components. Item 3.D. of Form 20-F, which documents the general
standard for risk factor disclosures by foreign private issuers, nevertheless
makes the disclosure of risks mentioned in a few examples similar to being
regulated by rule-based requirements.105 Legal norms in such intermediary,
blended forms do not eliminate the issuer’s judgment in producing
disclosures as much as a pure rule. For disclosure of corruption risks, an
alternative disclosure requirement might take the form of a brightline rule,
requiring any issuers having significant operations (perhaps over a defined
threshold) in high-corruption-risk jurisdictions to prominently disclose a
risk factor. Alternatively, the rule might adopt a softer form by asking
104. FORM 20-F, supra note 41, Item 5.A.
105. See supra note 45 (quoting the risk factors that Item 3.D. suggests that issuers disclose).
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issuers to describe their exposure to corruption risk in high-risk
jurisdictions “if material.” The SEC might even look beyond risk factors
and consider requiring issuers to specifically describe their anti-corruption
compliance programs in prominent parts of their filings, such as the
“Business” section; state their subjective evaluation of such programs’
effectiveness; and then allow them to include accompanying risk factor
language.
These alternative approaches might create different incentives for
corruption risk disclosure, and the SEC might choose among them based on
policy considerations. But here it suffices to note that any of these
approaches would be more effective than the current materiality standard at
promoting informative disclosure of corruption risk based on more careful
due diligence and analysis. By giving unequivocal notice to issuers that the
Commission views corruption risk as one area of regulatory focus, the
alternative requirements could elevate deliberation and diligence on
corruption risks to a much higher priority in the disclosure drafting process.
An explicit legal requirement should greatly reduce the incentive of issuers
and intermediaries to take chances by remaining willfully ignorant. Even
where issuers find the corruption topic sensitive and prefer avoiding it as
much as possible, underwriters and legal advisors could feel much less
stress when raising it with clients by pointing to legal requirements
expressly referencing corruption risks. Especially for underwriters,
requesting with a straight face additional diligence information and
disclosure discussion time from the issuer would be much easier if the
matter were a legal requirement rather than simply the bank’s internal
policy. For China-based issuers, explicit regulatory requirements should
also alleviate their concerns about risk disclosure’s potential ramifications
at home. They could relatively easily explain to their government
counterparties that the disclosure is made mostly to fulfill explicit
regulatory requirements in connection with their overseas financing
activities. If the rule-based requirement could incentivize China-based
companies to generally more often include corruption risk language in
filings, issuers would also worry less about drawing unwanted attention
from Chinese anti-bribery authorities simply for making such disclosure.
Overall, a rule-based requirement should counter much of the
challenges present in the disclosure drafting process under the materiality
standard. Increased disclosure because of changed incentives in the
drafting process might provide the market with more adequate information.
With greater issuer cooperation, higher quality due diligence would also
afford investors further protection by increasing the chance of uncovering
issues and taking feasible remedial measures before launching the
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transaction in the market.
VI. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE RULE-BASED APPROACH
This Part offers a preliminary discussion of a few possible objections
to the adoption of rule-based disclosure requirements for corruption risks.
Rather than preempting such objections, the major goal here is to explore
angles for further consideration of using disclosures effectively to regulate
corruption risks in securities investment.
A. Just Another Example of Lawyers Asking for Useless Additional
Disclosures?
A rule-based disclosure requirement should induce a greater number
of corruption risk disclosures by China-based issuers. Some suggest that
disclosure is “at worst, harmless”106 and can provide no more than “too
much information.”107 Others, in contrast, worry that too much disclosure
does more harm than good, as it may cause information overload.108
Moreover, some argue that the pervasive mandated disclosure is a failure as
the disclosed information is often wastefully under-utilized by the group
that the disclosure requirements are intended to inform and protect.109
The SEC has looked to enhance risk disclosures in recent years.110 In
October 2013, current Chair of the SEC Mary Jo White noted that the
lengthy risk factor sections in filings may suggest a problem of information
overload to which the Commission needs to attend in considering a
potential overhaul of disclosure requirements.111 Without disputing in
principle the concern of information overload, this Article has argued that
more clearly stipulated disclosure mandates in the specific context of
corruption risks of China-based securities may enhance investor protection.
106. Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 95, 107 (2011).
107. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 163 (1982).
108. See WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION
90 (1992) (“Some authors have theorized that . . . consumers may become overloaded with information
and respond to the additional information by making worse decisions.”); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL
E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 16982 (2014) (arguing that mandated disclosures can have perverse effects).
109. See generally BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 33–54 (describing various
documented failures of mandated disclosure).
110. Sarah Johnson, SEC Pushes Companies for More Risk Information, CFO MAG., Sept. 1, 2010,
at 16, available at http://ww2.cfo.com/risk-compliance/2010/09/sec-pushes-companies-for-more-riskinfo/.
111. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the National Association of
Corporate Directors Leadership Conference 2013: The Path Forward on Disclosure (Oct. 15, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806#.UrhZgbThfHY.
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As opposed to average consumers, securities investors unsurprisingly are
found to actually consider and respond to such information.112 The
presence of a savvy investment community that constantly studies and
digests company disclosures also makes it much more likely that securities
disclosure will have an impact. Moreover, as Parts IV and V discussed,
enhanced disclosure requirements for corruption risks could respond to
challenges posed by practical social dynamics that hamper good due
diligence and deliberation during the disclosure drafting process;
improvement in the due diligence and deliberation process would provide
greater protection to investors than disclosed information itself.
Under the rule-based requirement, all China-based companies might
simply include a corruption risk in their filings so that a “semi-pooling”
equilibrium would again prevent investors from distinguishing lowcorruption-risk companies from high-risk ones. Even if that is the case,
however, such pooling would be superior to the current equilibrium, at
which investors can mistakenly interpret the non-disclosure by high-risk
companies as signaling insignificant risk.113 Nevertheless, since low-risk
issuers would still have incentives to achieve better pricing, the rule-based
disclosure requirements could be designed to better promote differentiated
signals. For example, a rule might incorporate a materiality component
requiring all China-based companies to disclose corruption risk factors
“unless they do not have material exposure” to such risk. Such rule would
prevent issuers and underwriters from ignoring corruption risks but would
allow non-disclosure if they were to conclude after careful evaluation that
they had immaterial risk. In addition, the SEC should tolerate, as it in fact
very often does, mitigating language114 in corruption risk factors, such as
statements about the issuer’s industry being less susceptible to corruption
than other sectors in China. Furthermore, as noted earlier, China-based
issuers might be required to describe their anti-corruption compliance
programs affirmatively in prominent sections of the filings. Where risk
factor language used by different issuers might be reduced to boilerplates,
disclosure of risk control would offer some issuers another opportunity to
signal their relatively low corruption risks.

112. See Campbell et al., supra note 24.
113. See supra Part III.C.
114. The Staff generally advises against using mitigating language, such as clauses that begin with
“while,” “although,” or “however,” in risk factors. See, e.g., Staff Observations in the Review of
Smaller Reporting Company IPOs, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.
sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfsmallcompanyregistration.htm.
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B. Cost Matters?
Although implementing a rule-based requirement might generate
benefits currently unavailable under the materiality standard, one may
wonder if such benefits would be worth the associated cost.115 Without
engaging in a more rigorous cost-benefit analysis, intuitively, incremental
cost incurred by a rule-based requirement is unlikely to be excessive. The
cost of additional drafting will be per se minimal given the existence of
decent precedent disclosure language on the market.116 Greater cost might
arise if issuers and underwriters are motivated by the disclosure
requirement to conduct enhanced anti-corruption due diligence and spend
greater time deliberating risk issues. But a large part of such cost can be
deemed private because the enhanced diligence work often enhances firm
value through improved governance and risk control.
C. Isn’t the Current Requirement for Reporting on Internal Controls
Sufficient?
The Exchange Act Rules require that registered companies maintain
internal controls over financial reporting and include in their annual
shareholder reports both management and auditor attestations on internal
controls.117 Devising and maintaining effective internal controls can indeed
overlap with a company’s effort to control corruption risk. But the
compliance reality in China suggests that even companies with formal
internal controls attested to by auditors in accordance with the applicable
standard may still be susceptible to systemic corruption risks.118 Moreover,
the internal control report requirement is often less stringent on Chinabased companies, as many of them, being smaller or newly public, qualify
for an exemption.119 An enhanced requirement for the disclosure of
115. Even the SOX burden is actually less than usually claimed, however. See Erica Fung,
Regulatory Competition in International Capital Markets: Evidence from China in 2004–2005, 3
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 243, 264 (2006) (noting a remark made by a financial/legal advisor in China that the
frequently complained-of financial disclosure standards under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are not
“difficult to meet” and that foreign issuers often “exaggerate the burden”).
116. See supra Part I.
117. See (Item 308) Internal Control over Financial Reporting, 17 C.F.R. § 229.308 (2013);
Controls and Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2013); Controls and Procedures, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15d-15 (2013).
118. See, e.g., PetroChina Co. Ltd., supra note 71, at 98 (concluding that PetroChina’s internal
controls were effective, which was attested to by its auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers).
119. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b)–(c) (2012) (requiring domestic and foreign registrants that are
non-accelerated filers or “emerging growth companies” to include the management report but not the
auditor attestation report on internal control); 17 C.F.R. § 229.308 (exempting a company that has
newly conducted an IPO from complying with the internal control reporting requirements until its
second annual report filed with the SEC).
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corruption risk factors might be useful for duly warning investors and for
reminding issuers about the inherent limit on standard internal control.
This additional incentive would be particularly favorable if the incremental
cost is limited.
D. Is a Chinese Problem Worth a General Rule of U.S. Securities
Regulation?
It is nothing novel for U.S. securities laws to impose heightened
disclosure requirements relating to specific countries.120 In the vaguely
drafted Item 3.D. of Form 20-F, the SEC suggested that an issuer consider
disclosing risks “relating to the country where it operates.”121 Although
this Article discusses corruption risks relating to China-based securities,
however, corruption risks are definitely not special to China. As they are
beyond the scope of this Article, further studies may look into whether
securities disclosures by issuers from such other jurisdictions as India and
Latin America face similar deficiencies in disclosing corruption risks.
Conceptually, designing a rule-based disclosure requirement to cover
countries with high corruption risks in general would not be too difficult.
The scope of such a rule’s application might be defined, for example, by
referring to third-party corruption research, such as the Corruption
Perception Index published by Transparency International.122
CONCLUSION
Corruption poses multifaceted risks to securities investors who look
for protection provided by securities regulation. Some have argued that it
may have been an over-stretch for the SEC to deviate from its core
institutional mission by engaging in the battle against overseas corruption
by actively enforcing the FCPA.123 This Article serves as a reminder that
there is still potential room to improve the regulation of corruption risks
through enhanced risk disclosure requirements and that such regulatory
effort would fall squarely within the parameters of the U.S. securities laws’
core mission of protecting investors by promoting full disclosure of
information. Drawing upon filing searches and practical observations, this
Article calls for attention to the practical challenges present in the securities
120. A recent example is the addition of Section 13(r) to the Exchange Act, requiring issuers to
disclose dealings with Iran. Notice Required by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
of 2012 to Be Filed Through EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 19, 2012), http://
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfannouncements/itr-act2012.htm.
121. FORM 20-F, supra note 41, Item 3.D.
122. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 2.
123. See, e.g., Black, supra note 18, at 1095.
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disclosure drafting process, which are understood to contribute to deficient
corruption risk disclosures by China-based companies. By replacing the
current disclosure requirement based on the materiality standard with a
rule-based requirement, both disclosures of and underlying due diligence
on corruption risks should more effectively inform and protect investors in
China-based securities.
As the SEC is conducting its latest round of reviews of the securities
disclosure regime, the announced regulatory preferences seem to be
streamlining risk disclosures and eliminating boilerplates.124 Even though
improvement is due, this Article suggests that ideas for reform should not
be anchored to only reducing disclosure. Instead, the Commission should
remain open to different options and carefully analyze the behavioral
impacts of different forms of disclosure requirements.125 While the
findings and observations in this Article are inherently qualified by its
limited methodology,126 future studies may employ more rigorous
empirical analytical tools to shed further light on how disclosures may be
more effectively used as a relatively inexpensive way to regulate
investment risks.

124. See White, supra note 111 (using risk factors disclosure as an example for disclosure
language that might have grown more lengthy than really needed).
125. For an interesting proposal to reform risk factor disclosures based on the insights from
behavioral law and economics, see Tom C. W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 325 (2011).
126. See supra notes 56 and 90.

